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Introduction
It is argued that the most significant sociological contribution made by the Scottish
philosophers (like David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart etc.)
is the notion of spontaneously generated orders
1. Roughly the 'theory of spontaneous
order' asserts that social institutions and patterns - which are highly complex - are the
unintended consequences of numerous individual actions. Subject of this paper is the
problem of explaining the unintended consequences of human actions, particularly
explaining the emergence and maintenance of such social orders.
The notions of ‘unintended consequences of human action’ and ‘spontaneous order’
are closely related with the idea of the ‘invisible hand’. The ‘invisible hand’ denotes
the ‘invisibility’ in the process that, somehow, aggregates the dispersed actions of
individuals and brings about an orderly social phenomenon (social pattern or
institution), which was not intended by the individuals. It indicates that the
mechanism was invisible to the individuals. It is the task of the social scientist to
explicate this mechanism and to demonstrate the mechanism. The ‘invisible hand
explanation’ is the name given to such an exposition. ‘Invisible hand explanations’ try
to show the process that brings about the ‘unintended consequences of human action’.
'Invisible Hand Explanations' explains the emergence or maintenance of these special
kind of social phenomena, namely the social institutions and patterns, which are the
(unintended) consequences of human action but not the results of human design. Or as
Nozick (1974: 19) formulates "an invisible hand explanation explains what looks to
be the product of someone's intentional design, as not being brought about by
anyone's intentions".
The insight that is provided by the theory of spontaneous order is implicit in invisible
hand explanations: a common sense approach would associate a complex order with
design; but invisible hand explanations are supposed to go beyond this, and tell us
how it is possible that these patterns and institutions are the unintended consequences
of human action.
It is needless to say that many explanations in social sciences employ the notion of
'invisible hand'--implicitly or explicitly. Given the widespread usage of the notion of
'invisible hand', 'invisible hand explanations' is an interesting subject for the
philosophy of social science. However, only little attention was paid to 'invisible hand
explanations' in philosophy of social science literature. An important question is "the
nature of invisible hand explanations". What is the essence of an invisible hand
explanation? Or what makes an explanation an 'invisible hand explanation'? The other
questions follow from these: How 'invisible hand explanations' differ from other types
of explanation? What are our criteria for a good invisible hand explanation?
                                               
1 For example see Hamowy (1987)N N N. ..    E E Em m mr r ra a ah h h    A A AY Y YD D DI I IN N NO O ON N NA A AT T T I I In n nv v vi iis s si iib b bl lle e e    H H Ha a an n nd d d    E E Ex x xp p pl lla a an n na a at t ti iio o on n ns s s 3
In this paper I have the objective to start thinking about these questions. To answer
these questions a critical examination of the paradigmatic examples of the invisible
hand explanations is necessary. These include i) origin of the media of exchange
(Menger, 1892); ii) Thomas Schelling's (1969) model of residential segregation; iii)
creation of money in the banking system (Samuelson, 1958, Ch. 15); iv) Nozick's
account of the so-called minimal state (Nozick, 1974, part I); v) Ludwig von Mises's
(1949) discussion of how economic calculation is accomplished by markets; vi) The
Austrian Theory of trade cycle (See Ebeling, 1978); and others
2
As mentioned earlier, in this paper I try to undertake the task of examining Menger's
explanation of the emergence of the medium of exchange. This exercise, with the
examination of some other paradigmatic examples, will help us in clarifying the
notion of ‘invisible hand explanations’. The proposed method for understanding
‘invisible hand explanations’ is as follows. Examine the philosophical literature on
‘invisible hand explanations’; report and clarify the problems, ambiguities; examine
the paradigmatig examples of ‘invisible hand explanations’; clarify the features of
these explanations; and use this clarification to solve the problems in the
philosophical literature. Thus, this paper can be considered as a part of this research
project.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The second section introduces the literature on
"invisible hand explanations". The third section examines Menger's explanation of
'the origin of money'. (Section 3.1 introduces some remarks about the organism
metaphor in Menger; 3.2 tries to clarify the meaning of ''unintended consequences of
human action'; 3.3 summarizes Menger's notion of 'Organic Explanation'; 3.4
examines his explanation of the emergence of the money universal.) The fourth
section summarizes the implications of my analysis of Menger's explanation. Finaly
the fifth section concludes the paper.
1.  Invisible Hand Explanations
The Idea of explaining the unintended consequences of human action finds its roots in
the writings of eighteenth century Scottish thinkers. However, the idea can be traced
back further to Bernard Mandeville. In his Fable of the Bees (1714), Mandeville
thought that the growth of social institutions, advancement of knowledge, laws,
prohibitions, ordinances, restrictions and the language could be considered as the
unintended consequences of human action. But he did not, as Ullmann-Margalit
(1998) argues, consider 'how'. Scottish thinkers, on the other hand, tried to explain the
phenomena that they thought to be the unintended consequences of human action. In
the Treatise of Human Nature (1740) David Hume examined the rules of Justice,
Property Rights, Money
3 and Language. In the History of Civil Society (1767), and
                                               
2 Nozick (1974: 20-21) gives sixteen examples for invisible hand explanations.
3 “In the like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteemed
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Principles of Moral and Practical Science (1792), Adam Ferguson considered the
private property and language. And Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759) and Wealth of Nations (1776), examined the laws of morality, changes in
principle means by which wealth is produced, division of labour and the market
4.
Moreover, Smith introduced the ‘invisible hand’ metaphor when he was examining
these phenomena, which are the unintended consequences of human action
5.
As Vaughn (1989: 168) argues Smith used the invisible hand metaphor to describe the
principle by which a beneficial social order emerged as the unintended consequences
of individual human action. Later, the notion of ‘invisible hand explanations’ became
the generally accepted title for the type of explanations that Smith and others were
after.
As mentioned before, the ideas of 'spontaneous order' and 'unintended results of
human action' are closely linked with invisible hand explanations. The notion was
introduced by Nozick (1974), and the classical piece on the notion is Ullmann-
Margalit's 1978 article. A very brief history of the IHEs is as follows. Scottish
thinkers introduced the notions of ‘unintended consequences of human action’ and
‘spontaneous order’. In the meanwhile, Smith came with the ‘invisible hand’
metaphor for these notions. Menger (1883) introduced ‘organic explanations’ which
he thought to be appropriate to examine the ‘unintended consequences of human
action and the spontaneous order. Later, Nozick refined the idea of organic
explanations and called them invisible hand explanations referring to Smith’s
metaphor.
As I have argued in my introduction, I think that to have a philosophically
sophisticated account of invisible hand explanations, we must first deal with the
paradigmatic examples of invisible hand explanations. For this reason, I will not
                                               
4 Also he tried to explain destruction of the power of the medieval church (actual), Historical
development of the administration of justice in England (actual).
5 "...in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own
conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the
thousands whom they employ be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable
desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by
an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which
would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
inhabitants: and thus, without intending it, without making it, advance the interest of the
society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species." (Smith, 1759, IV, 1. 304-
5, emphasis added)
"As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital
in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be
of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of
the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic
to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote
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review the literature on invisible hand explanations here, rather I will only focus on
Menger's explanation of the emergence of the medium of exchange.
First, lets look closely to the phenomena that invisible hand explanations want to
explain. The traditional distinction about phenomena is the distinction between the
natural and the artificial phenomena. Natural phenomena are independent from human
action / design and artificial phenomena are the results of human action / design.
Under the heading of artificial phenomena, in which human agency is essential, we
can place a subgroup that covers the "consequences of human action but not human
design" (Hayek, 1960, 1967). This realm, which Ullmann-Margalit (1978: 263)
defines as the social realm
6, is the subject of the theory of spontaneous order. Thus,
here we are confronted with the unintended consequences of human action.
As I have argued before, explanandum of an invisible hand explanation is the
emergence or maintenance of such unintended consequences of human action
7.
However, 'unintended consequences of human action' is a vague notion. Consider the
following quote from Popper:
"The main task of the theoretical social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences
of intentional human actions" Popper (1962: 342, original italics deleted and emphasis
added)
"Unintended results of intended actions" can mean anything, and it is crucial for us to
find out what unintended consequences of human action mean from the viewpoint of
invisible hand explanations
8.
Second, it is important to ask 'when we can say that an explanation increases our
understanding.  According to Salmon (1989: 135) we can find three viable answers to
this question in the literature: Our understanding is increased
i.  when we obtain the knowledge of the hidden mechanisms, causal or other,
that produce the phenomenon we seek to explain;
ii.  when our knowledge of the world is so organized that we can comprehend
what we know under a smaller number of assumptions than previously;
                                               
6 I find this classification misleading. Social realm should cover the results of human action, but also
human design.
7 Here I must introduce the distinction between the two explananda of invisible hand explanations: i)
emergence of unintended consequences of human action and ii) maintenance of unintended
consequences of human action
7. Ullmann-Margalit (1978: 283) argues that basic questions addressed
different for each explanandum. For the first one, question is: "how did it - or how could it have - come
about?" For the latter question is: "why is it in existence?"
7 Please note that my example of invisible
hand explanations ('Origin of Money') is an explanation of emergence. So I will not deal with the
difficulties about explaining maintenance.
8 A detailed analysis of the "unintended consequences" can be found in Aydinonat (forthcoming, June
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iii.  when we supply missing bits of descriptive knowledge that answer why-
questions and remove us from particular sorts of intellectual predicaments.
Of course other criteria for increased understanding can be supplied. But simply let us
test invisible hand explanations - particularly Menger's explanation - against these
criteria.
Third, if we accept the idea that
"scientific explanation is primarily an attempt to reveal some essential relationships in
the real world. Explanation is a matter of genuine theory with successful reference to and
representation of same apparently non-obvious real grounds for occurrences in the word.
Thus theories are essential for explaining phenomena." (Mäki 1990a: 319)
we can check if invisible hand explanations are successful at exposing the real
relations in the world, and how they do this.
Fourth, the relation of 'invisible hand explanations' with other types of explanations is
an important point of focus for our study. Although one example would not be enough
to assess this relationship, I will try to introduce some ideas in conclusion.
Other points of focus can be introduced, but it is this paper's task to deal with ones
mentioned above. Of course, when I am examining Menger's explanation, I will touch
upon other important issues about invisible hand explanations. Now lets proceed to
Menger.
2. Origin Of Money
In this section, I will try to introduce the details of Menger's explanation of the
"emergence of money" as a paradigmatic example of invisible hand explanations.
Menger characterizes his explanation as an "organic explanation". In Investigations
Menger gives a detailed account of “organic explanations.” Organic explanation is an
explanation given to the so-called organic social phenomena. Hence, to understand
‘organic explanations’, we have to have a clear understanding of Menger's definition
of 'organic social phenomena'.
Menger (1883:130) thinks that there is an analogy between social life and organisms.
However, he argues that the analogy between the social life and organism is a limited
but a useful one. There are two kinds of similarities: one between 'nature and function
of natural organisms,' and social structures, and the other between the results of a
natural process and the unintended results of historical development. Moreover, he
states two limitations for this analogy: First, only a part of social phenomena exhibits
analogy to natural organisms—that is the phenomena which are the unintended
consequences of human action. Second, this analogy is not a complete one - that is;
the analogy does not allow us to use exactly the same methods of explaining natural
organisms. It is clear form Menger's introduction of the analogy between social life
and natural organisms, that 'organic explanations' are only appropriate for the
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2.1. Notes about Menger's 'Organism Metaphor'
It is possible to find a variety of uses of the organism metaphor in the history of the
social sciences, and particularly in economics. As Hutter (1994: 291) notes, highly
complex "bodies" with obvious, yet unintelligible structures, when found, invited the
attempt of being interpreted as organisms in any area of research. Hutter gives Kant's
definition of an organism as an example;
1. The idea of the whole determines form and connection of the parts;
2. The parts determine themselves mutually;
3. The organic whole reproduces itself in totality;
to show that this type of definitions may be applicable to a wide variety of phenomena
(see Hutter, 1994). However, as I mentioned above, Menger uses the analogy quite
cautiously. First, it can only be applied to a specific part of the social realm. Second,
analogy is far from being perfect. I will deal with the first part of the limitations later
in this paper.
For the imperfect nature of the analogy Menger notes:
"[...] it is not an analogy that covers the entire nature of the phenomena concerned, but
only partial aspects of them. In this respect it is again only a partial analogy" Menger
(1883: 131)
For example Menger (1883: 133) refuses the idea of mutual causation between the
whole and its parts, he thinks that this is a vague idea and it is inadequate for our laws
of thinking. More importantly he argues that forces acting in nature are different than
the ones in social realm. In nature purely mechanical forces are working, but the
social realm is dominated by intentional activities
9. "They are, rather, the result of
human efforts, the efforts of thinking, feeling, acting human beings." (Menger 1883:
133)
Menger's arguments, about the limitations of the 'organism analogy', is one reason for
not considering him as a member of the organic school. Another reason, which is
related to this position, is his individualistic approach. As Hutter (1994: 305) argues
he "defends the 'atomistic' paradigm against the dominating historical and organic
paradigms". Thus, he is not using the 'analogy' in its generally accepted form, for
what he defends - 'atomistic' paradigm - can be considered as opposite to organism
metaphor. He uses the organism metaphor, however he also elaborates the "study of
individual atoms who enter into the equilibrium system" (Stark, 1962: 176) as an
economic approach.
                                               
9 I think he is not clear about the nature of forces acting in the social realm. I will not deal with this
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"The acknowledgement of a number of social phenomena as 'organisms' is in no way in
contradiction to the aspiration for exact (atomistic!) understanding of them." Menger
(1883: 141, emphasis in original)
From the above argument, it should be clear that even though Menger thinks that
origin and function of the unintended results of human action resemble that of
organisms’, he does not argue that they should be examined in a collectivist way. And
since he uses the analogy in his own way, it is important for us to have a clear grasp
of where the analogy is applicable - that is, we have to understand what he means by
the "unintended consequences".
2.2. Unintended Consequences?
There are several reasons to examine the "unintended consequences of human action"
from a general point of view. First, as noted earlier, 'unintended consequences of
human action' is a very vague notion, for it covers all unintended consequences of all
types of actions. Second, although it is evident that people use this notion to indicate a
particular subset of the all possible unintended consequences of human action, it is
hard to find a good classification of the unintended consequences of human action.
Last, but not the least, the concept is used incautiously in the literature--that is
sometimes it is not clear which subset is under examination. Thus, before examining
Menger's text and demonstrating his understanding of the 'unintended consequences',
it is a good idea to approach the subject matter from a general point of view.
However, in what follows I will not do this. For this paper it is enough for us to see
Menger's conception of the "unintended consequences".
Let's start with the famous Mengerian question:
"How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely
significant for its development come into being without a common will directed toward
establishing them? [...] What is the nature of all the above social phenomena [...] and
how can we arrive at a full understanding of their nature?" " Menger (1883: 146, 147)
To answer these questions, Menger (1883) makes a distinction between two types of
'social patterns and institutions': those resulting from the purposeful activity of human
beings and unintended results of historical development. This distinction needs two
clarifications: one about the meaning of the 'purposeful activity' and the other about
the meaning of 'unintended results'.
'Purposeful activity' can have different meanings according to the 'target' of this
activity. Simply we can distinguish between targets that are located at the individual
level and social level. If the individual(s) is (are) intentionally acting to create a social
pattern or institution, we can say that target of the activity is at the social level. But if
the individual(s) is (are) intentionally acting to reach their individual goals without
having any intention to create or change a social pattern or institution, then the target
of the activity is at the individual level.
To understand what Menger means, let's look at another phrasing of this distinction in
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"This is that some social phenomena are the results of a common will directed toward
their establishment (agreement, positive legislation, etc.), while others are the unintended
result of human efforts aimed at attaining essentially individual goals (the unintended
results of these)." Menger (1883: 133, emphasis in original)
Apparently, this wording looks less confusing. But it does not fit into the distinction I
have made above. It is evident from the text that Menger does not want to rule out
"individual planners". So not only the results of a 'common will', but also the results
of an 'individual will' aimed at the social level are different from the unintended
results of human action. So if we talk in intentional terms: Social patterns or
institutions that are the results of we-intention or I-intention are different from the
unintended results of human action
10. To understand the concept of ‘unintended
results of human action’ one can distinquish between individual and collective
goals
11. However, both individual and collective goals can be directed to the
individual or social level. So I recommend focusing on the level of the targets -
individual or social - only.
To clear the meaning of 'unintended results', Mäki (1990c) introduces the notion of
sphere of intendedness, "which denotes the set of states of affairs that an acting agent
intended to bring about by his or her act, irrespective of he or she was successful in
the effort" (Mäki, 1990b: 302). Thus all of the consequences which does not belong to
this sphere of intendedness are unintended consequences of that particular activity.
However, it is clear that Menger's 'unintended consequences' are a subset of this broad
definition. Depending on what he say, let me list the constraints that Menger impose
on this definition. Or in other words, for a consequence to be considered as an
'organic social phenomena' following conditions must be satisfied:
1. 'Consequence' must be an 'unintended consequence'.
2. Individual intentions must be directed to the individual level
3. The 'unintended consequences' must be located at the social level
12.
4. There must be more than one individual. And, 'unintended consequence'
must be dependent on the existence of many individuals
13.
Fourth constraint can be justified as follows: Menger uses the analogy of an organism
for the 'unintended consequences' of human action. And he argues that the society is
                                               
10 I use the terms, we-intention and I-intention, in the simple sense, respectively indicating the
existence and non-existence of a common will.
11 Further distinctions about individual and collective goal can be made, but they are not useful for our
purposes.
12 Menger is not interested with the 'unintended results', which have nothing to do with the social
patterns or institutions.
13 Please note the difference between Merton's 'unintended consequences' and Menger's notion of
unintended consequences: Merton seems to be covering the whole spectrum of the unintended
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like an organism in the sense that the parts of the society (organism) are required for
the functioning and changing of the society (organism). Because Menger thinks that
the analogy is imperfect, his remarks about ‘society being a unity’ must be read with
caution. He thinks that organic relation is only between the 'unintended consequences
of human action' - these are social patterns and institutions - and the individuals. This
means that individuals are required for the functioning and changing of the social
patterns and institutions. Thus there must be more than one individual. And,
'unintended consequence' must be dependent on the existence of many individuals.
Nevertheless, it is possible to derive a fifth constraint from the Menger's starting
question: "How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are
extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will
directed toward establishing them?" From this passage, we understand that he is
interested in 'unintended consequences' that are beneficial for the members of the
society.
5. 'Consequence' must be beneficial for the members of the society.
This is important because it implies that the process that brings about the 'unintended
consequences' is in 'order' like the natural processes - according to Menger. Thus one
can argue that the fifth condition is a necessary part of Menger’s notion of
‘unintended consequences’. However, I think that it is also plausible to argue that the
fifth condition is not a necessary condition for being an 'unintended consequence of
human action'. It can be considered as part of Menger's formulation of the
explanandum question. He is only interested in the beneficial unintended results of
human action.
This implies that even under this smaller subset of unintended consequences one can
deal with different issues. Menger is interested in socially desirable unintended
consequences, but there might be (indeed, there are) others who are trying to explain
the emergence or persistence of a socially undesirable outcomes. It is, thus, important
to clarify what 'unintended consequence' means for every single example we examine.
Here we have seen what it means for Menger. Now we can concentrate on how he
explains these 'unintended consequences'.
2.3. Organic Explanation
Since 'organic explanation' explains the 'organic social phenomena', these conditions
are also the necessary conditions to give an 'organic explanation'. But an 'organic
explanation' in Menger's sense needs an additional constraint:
Organic explanation explains either the origin or the function of the social patterns or
institutions that are the unintended consequences of human action
14.
                                               
14 "It tries, rather, to explain the origin and the functions of these unified structures in an exact way, to
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Explaining the 'origin' means merely the explaining the 'emergence'. It is an account
of how a social institution or pattern could have emerged. 'Organic explanation' is not
always the true description of the process that brought about the social institution or
pattern, but it helps us in understanding the emergence of the social institution or
pattern. So we can argue that there is an explicatory import in the explanation.
Menger (1883: 155) argues that 'organic explanation' is an imperfect explanation. But
because there is no other way of finding out how these social patterns or institutions
did come into existence, this theoretical reconstruction makes the process of
emergence intelligible. Hayek (1967: 75-76) was also aware of this explicatory import
in Menger's explanation. He argues that Menger realized that "existence of the
structures with which the theory of complex phenomena is concerned can be made
intelligible only by what the physicists would call cosmology, that is a theory of
evolution". However, nothing is said about evolution and evolutionary forces
(selection, mutation etc.) in Menger's account of organic explanation.
Arguments about the explanation of the function of the social patterns or institutions,
hardly take place in Menger's approach. But I think it is not hard to derive them from
his arguments about the analogy:
"In natural organisms we can observe a complexity almost incalculable in detail, and
especially a great variety of their parts (single organs). All this variety, however, is
helpful in the preservation, development, and the propagation of the organisms as units.
Each part of them has its specific function in respect to this result. The disturbance of this
function, according to its intensity or the significance of the organ concerned, results in a
more or less intensive disturbance of the function of the whole organism, or of the other
organs. Conversely a disturbance of the connection of the organs forming a higher unit of
an organism are thus conditioned by those of its parts; the latter in turn are conditioned
by the connection of the parts to form a higher unit; and finally the normal function and
development of each single organ are conditioned by those of the remaining organs.
We can make an observation similar in many respects in reference to a series of social
phenomena in general and human economy in particular." Menger (1883: 129 - 130)
Keeping the limitations of this analogy (and the cautions in the previous subsection)
in mind we can argue that, 'organic explanation' of functions is what we call
'functional analysis'. Roughly, in functional analysis, functions of the components of a
system are defined referring to the task they are accomplishing within that system. To
repeat, explanandum of functional analysis is some property or capacity of a system
(for a detailed account see Aydinonat, 1999). Thus, it is not possible to derive from
Menger's arguments that 'organic explanation' explains the persistence of a system
(social pattern or institution) referring to the function it serves. Rather, it explains the
                                                                                                                                      
"What the exact orientation of research strives for is on the one hand the clarification of the special
nature of the 'unity' of those structures which are designed as social organisms. On the other, it strives
for the exact explanation of their origin and function "Menger (p. 143)
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function of the system (social pattern or institution) referring to the functions of the
parts of the system
15.
Thus the above constraint on 'organic explanations' dissolves into the following:
'Organic explanation'
1.1. Explains how a social pattern or institution could have emerged,
1.1.2. Is an account of the process that brings about the social pattern or institution
('unintended consequences' of human action.), or
1.2. Explains a function (or a property) of the social pattern or institution.
I have tried to list the constraints for being an 'organic social phenomena', and to give
an organic explanation. No other conditions can be deduced from Menger's
Investigations. But since he introduces an example of organic explanations, the best
way to proceed is to look at the example and try to find out other conditions.
2.4. Emergence of Money
First of all, I think, it is important to detect Menger's question. He is trying to explain
the emergence of money. However he is not trying to explain the emergence of
particular coins and banknotes. Explanandum here is the "emergence of the generally
acceptable media of exchange"
16.
"There is a phenomenon which has from of old and in a peculiar degree attracted the
attention of social philosophers and practical economists, the fact of certain commodities
(these being in advanced civilizations coined pieces of gold and silver, together
subsequently with documents representing those coins) becoming universally acceptable
media of exchange." Menger (1892: 239, emphasis added)
It needs to be explained, because it is apparently contrary to the common sense
17:
Why should one "be ready to exchange his goods for little metal disks apparently
useless as such"(Menger, 1892: 239)? Menger argues that although it looks like a
product of an intentional design, it is not, and gives us his story for the emergence of
the generally acceptable medium of exchange.
One of the fundamental constituents of this explanation is the ‘difference in the
saleableness of goods’:
                                               
15 One can, of course, explain the persistence of a system, referring to the functions of the part
constituting the system. But there is nothing that implies this in Menger’s argument.
16 For a excellent interpretation of the explanation of the 'money universal' see Mäki (1990b). "Its
capacity to function in the role of a generally accepted medium of exchange constitutes its essential
economic property that defines its nominal essence." Mäki (1990b: 305)
17 Mäki (1990b, 1997) argues that this is one of the reasons to consider Menger as a 'scientific realist'.
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"Men have been led, with increasing knowledge of their individual interests, each by his
own economic interests, without convention, without legal compulsion, nay, even
without any regard to the common interest, to exchange goods destined for exchange
(their "wares") for other goods equally destined for exchange, but more saleable."
Menger (1892: 247)
It is important to note here that he presupposes theory of the saleableness of goods.
Reader can find the constituents of the theory of the saleableness of goods in
Appendix. In this theory Menger gives us the list of possible causes and conditions for
the differences in the saleableness of goods. But he does not specify which ones were
the actual forces in the process of the emergence of money.
Given the differences in the saleableness of goods how could a generally accepted
medium of exchange emerge? To answer this question Menger tells us the details of
the process that brought about the generally accepted medium of exchange.
First of all Menger defines the initial conditions for the process to start. Initial
conditions are defined by the existence of barter (direct exchange) and intentions of
the individuals to exchange goods for good(s), which they have immediate need. It is
generally argued that Menger's analysis starts with pure barter
18. However, it is
important to note that Menger is talking about market dependent individuals. These
individuals need to exchange goods at the market place to survive. It follows from this
that people are uncomfortable with barter (direct exchange); Menger assumes that
existence of barter makes it hard to exchange the goods they want at the market place.
Thus, Menger tries to define some behavioral patterns, private beliefs and interests for
the initial conditions: He also defines the contrasts between individuals interests and
acting environment.
Let X1, ... , Xn be the goods exchanged in the market; and assume that X1 represents
the most saleable good and Xn represents the less saleable good. Let SXi define the
saleability of the goods. Then some of the initial conditions can be defined like this:
1.X1, ... , Xn are exchanged directly in the market.
2.There is no definite exchange relation between goods.
3.SX1 > SX2 > ... > SXn, thus owners of the more saleable goods exchange their goods
more easily than owners of the less saleable goods.
Note that SXi (saleability of the goods) differs from place to place and from one time
to the other (see Appendix). So actually there could have been competing goods with
close degree of saleability. But remember that he is not trying to explain the
emergence of particular coins or banknotes. He is trying to explain the emergence of
the medium of exchange. Thus, particular goods (like gold or silver) which were
selected is not important from his standpoint.
One of the conditions for the process to proceed is the increased market traffic:
                                               
18 For example see Mäki (1990c: 165)N N N. ..    E E Em m mr r ra a ah h h    A A AY Y YD D DI I IN N NO O ON N NA A AT T T I I In n nv v vi iis s si iib b bl lle e e    H H Ha a an n nd d d    E E Ex x xp p pl lla a an n na a at t ti iio o on n ns s s 14
"With the extension of traffic in space and with the expansion over ever longer intervals
of time of prevision for satisfying material needs, each individual would learn, from his
own economic interests, to take good heed that he bartered his less saleable goods for
those special commodities which displayed, beside the attraction of being highly saleable
in the particular locality, a wide range of saleableness both in time and place. These
wares would be qualified by their costliness, easy transportability, and fitness for
preservation (in connection with the circumstance of their corresponding to a steady and
widely distributed demand), to ensure to the possessor a power, not only 'here' and 'now'
but as nearly as possible unlimited in space and time generally, over all other market-
goods at economic prices." Menger (1892: 247)
Then as the market traffic increases possibility 'of individuals to detect effects and
advantages of the more saleable goods (in exchange)' will increase. Thus Menger
specifies a condition which implies the increase in needs, gains and losses of
individuals
19. Only after this it is useful for him to define driving forces in the
process.
The most significant force in the process is the 'individuals who are engaged in
economizing actions'. Menger's individual, a, is capable of the following:
• a can observe the conditions in the market
• a observes that there is x in the market
• a realizes that in case of x it is for his interest to do y
• a does y
• every individual will do the same
I think, here, Menger defines a ‘rational individual’. Although, his definition is
independent from the market conditions, he argues that the tendency to behave
rationally (to economize) increases as the intensity of exchange increases.
The last part of this definition is quite interesting. As individual capacities of
'realizing' facts can differ, this will take time and this process will involves imitation
(see Kuniñski, 1992 and Horwitz 1999). So the process can also be considered as a
discovery (or learning) process. More specifically the process goes as follows:
• a will observe the greater demand for certain wares and greater saleability
of certain wares / a will realize that if you have more saleable goods, you
can easily exchange them for the goods you want / a will exchange his/her
goods for more saleable ones / every individual will do the same / a
observes that "exchange of less saleable wares for those greater
marketability, durability, divisibility, etc., is in the interest of every
individual"
20 / a realizes (maybe as one of the innovators) that for the sake
of these characteristics it will be advantageous to him/her to accept an item
                                               
19 When there are more goods to exchange the trouble of bringing it to the market, the loss resulting
from no-exchange or exchange for the goods that are not demanded immediately, and the gain from
selling the goods will increase.
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which per se is perhaps utterly useless to him/her in barter / ever individual
will do the same
Given the high level of market transactions and economic dependency of the
individuals on market transactions
21, individuals try to minimize their transaction
costs by using more saleable goods in their exchange. When considered with the
theory of the saleability of goods, in this process some of the goods are filtered as
nominees for generally medium of exchange. Although individuals intentionally
prefer some goods to others for exchange, no individual in the process has the
intention of bringing about a generally accepted medium of exchange.
There is also a positive feedback in the process, which keeps the process going on:
"When the relatively most saleable commodities have become 'money', the great event
has in the first place the effect of substantially increasing their originally high
saleableness. Every economic subject bringing less saleable wares to market, to acquire
goods of another sort, has thenceforth a stronger interest in converting what he has in the
first instance into the wares which have become money." Menger (1892: 248)
Thus both the range and relative ranking of the goods (according to their saleability)
are changing in the process. Also the circumstances they are exchanged in are
changing.
End stage in Menger's explanation is emergence of the generally accepted medium of
exchange. This is an institution that serves to common welfare, as the result of a
process in which "rational" individuals show self-interested behaviors.
I think it is plausible to argue that Menger gives a very detailed picture of the process
that brings about the "unintended consequences"
22. It is important to note that the
driving forces of the process and the possible causes (and conditions) for the
saleability of goods are almost fully introduced in the explanation. Following from
this we can argue that one mold of Menger's 'organic explanations' are specific
explanations (explains the emergence) of specific phenomena (organic social
phenomena) which involves a detailed account of the process of emergence. The other
mold of Menger's organic explanations is not very clear. But as I have argued it can
be considered as an example of functional analysis.
3. Lessons from Menger
Lets turn back to our points of focus. I have tried clarify the notion of "unintended
consequences of human action" in the previous section. So I will proceed to the
second point, which was related with the increase in our understanding.
                                               
21 See Dalton (1965, 1971) for a detailed information about the uses of money in primitive cultures and
definition of a market economy.
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Although Menger's explanation is not related with political theory, I want to start with
Nozick's account of fundamental explanation in political realm. Nozick (1974: 6)
defines the fundamental explanations in the political realm as the ones that explain
fully in terms of non-political. And argues:
"A theory of state of nature that begins with fundamental general descriptions of morally
permissible and impermissible actions, and of deeply based reasons why some persons in
any society would violate these moral constraints, and goes on to describe how a state
would arise from that state of nature will serve our explanatory purposes, even if no
actual state ever arose that way." Nozick (1974: 7, emphasis in original)
Here Nozick touches upon one of the important characteristics of Menger's
explanation. Menger's explanation does not refer to actual events. He just gives the
possible causes, conditions and the driving forces in the process that brings about the
generally accepted medium of exchange. It is not an explanation of a concrete event.
Thus, to explain which particular good (gold or silver or etc.) was selected as money
in a specific place and time, one would need the specify which of the possible causes
and conditions were actually present
23.
Related with this Ullmann-Margalit (1978: 276) argues that "regardless of whether or
not an invisible hand explanation is the correct account of how the pattern in question
actually emerged, I contend that it is of value as an (at least partial) explication of the
associated concept." Thus, as I have argued before, there is an explicatory import in
Menger's explanation. It makes us understand how it is possible that the 'generally
accepted medium of exchange' can emerge without anyone intending to bring it about.
Menger's explanation provides us the 'invisible' mechanisms that produce the
phenomenon he seeks to explain. It also supplies the descriptive knowledge about the
mechanism, which, in turn, enables us to use it in our explanations of the concrete
events.
The 'invisible hand explanations' makes us remember the old concept 'conjectural
history'. Stewart (1971: 33) argues that to answer the questions about the 'unintended
consequences of human action, "one can not expect to glean much information from
history, which means that we are forced to fill 'the place of fact by conjecture'.
Although it is impossible for us to reconstruct the process by which a certain
phenomenon has been produced, as Stewart goes on to say, it is often important to
show how it could have been produced" (Keller, 1994: 36 emphasis in original).
Mäki (1990c:171) argues that an 'invisible hand consequence' is contingent upon
social conditions. However, we have seen that Menger does not define the real or
actual conditions for the emergence of the money phenomenon, he uses a highly
abstract model, which has no reference to real events in history. So how can we say
that he explained something, or we increased our understanding about the emergence
of the money phenomenon?
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We know that barter and market depended economies - with direct exchange - existed
or might exist. We know that when people are dependent on the market, they might be
willing to search for easier methods for acquiring what they want. We can see that in
such and such conditions using a more saleable commodity looks like to be first thing
that would come into mind. We can also understand that when people exchange more
easily there might be an increase in the market traffic, which in turn enforces the use
of the more saleable goods for exchange. We understand that the saleability of these
goods depend on many things, and in different places and at different times it is
possible to find a different set of the goods of highest saleability. We know that if
people tend to use these goods when they exchange goods this set of goods will be the
goods that would be expected for exchange at the market place. Thus we can
understand that a set of goods might be chosen as the mediums of exchange without a
common-will.
So according to Salmon's criteria we can say that we have increased our
understanding about the emergence of the money with Menger's explanation.
Although Menger's explanation does not refer to concrete events, he is talking about
real (causal) mechanisms behind the emergence of 'money'. However, it is not clear if
Menger's explanation satisfies Salmon's second constraint. We can not say confidently
that it provides us the knowledge that would make us comprehend what we know
under a smaller number of assumptions than previously. But we can say that it
explains the emergence of the medium of exchange with a small number of concepts
and assumptions. This brings us to our third point.
Menger argues that economics is an 'exact science' that studies 'exact types' and exact
laws'. According to Mäki (1990b: 295) this can be interpreted like the following:
"Economics as an exact science, then, is a theoretical study of universals".
Universals are features (properties, kinds, relations) shared by many particular
objects
24. "Money particulars have many powers and capacities, such as those of
enabling purchases of goods in the market, measuring and preserving value..." (Mäki,
1990b: 299). Thus, Menger's explanandum phenomenon seems to represent one
particular common feature (or function) of the particular instances of money (coins,
banknotes, etc.), namely being a medium of exchange. So, Menger's explanandum
phenomenon can be considered as a universal. The economizing individual, which is
the main driving force in the process that brings about the money universal, is another
abstraction from the reality.
We can say that, if the explanandum phenomenon is a universal and its explanantia
includes universals, then it can be characterized as an abstract explanation - or as an
explanation which embodies an abstract representation of the reality. Menger's
explanation is an attempt to reveal the essential relationships in the real world. It is
not an explanation about the concrete events. The process that brings about the
explanandum phenomenon is characterized with an abstract mechanism (invisible
                                               
24 For a detailed analysis of universals in relation with Menger and Austrian explanation see: Mäki
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hand mechanism), which represents what is thought to be the essential relationships in
reality.  Theory of the saleableness of goods demonstrates the possible causes and
conditions for the differences in the saleableness of goods
25. His theory of the
invisible hand mechanisms, that links the economizing action to the emergence of the
money universal, sets the conditions (like existence of market dependent economy
and barter, differences in the saleability of goods) for mechanism to work. Thus,
explanation of the emergence of the generally accepted medium of exchange seems to
be successful at representing what Menger thinks to be the real world relations
26.
Before going to our fourth point of focus (that is to the concluding remarks), let me
make some remarks about Menger's explanation in relation to invisible hand
explanations
27.
First, one of the essential features of invisible hand explanations is the nature of the
explanandum phenomenon. Explanandum phenomenon is the unintended
consequence of human actions in a special sense
28. Recall Menger's conception of the
unintended consequences, the first four constraints can apply to invisible hand
explanations in general.
Second reference to an invisible hand process is essential for an invisible hand
explanation. In the explanation, there must be a process that links the explanandum
phenomenon to individual actions. Some clarification is in line:
The nature of the explanandum phenomenon (being an unintended consequence)
implies that there must be something linking the actions of individuals whose
intentions are directed to the individual level to the unintended consequence. Without
providing this link an invisible hand explanation can not go beyond its presupposition
that 'social entities are the unintended consequence of human actions'.
Remember that invisibility comes from the unintendedness of the consequence, or
differently, from the invisibility of the mechanism that brings about the unintended
consequences. As I have noted before the explicatory import of invisible hand
explanations comes form explicating this mechanism and showing that what is
thought to be a consequence of design is an unintended consequence of the dispersed
actions of individuals.
                                               
25 Which includes the differences in the saleableness of the same good at different places and times.
26 Menger can be considered as an essential realist. For arguments see Mäki (1990b, 1997)
27 These are provisionary remarks, since I did not examine the other paradigmatic examples in this
paper. However, I think these remarks are necessary to relate this paper to the existing literature. For
more details see Aydinonat (forthcoming, June 2000)
28 This is coherent with the philosophical literature - of course: One of the essential features of invisible
hand explanations is that its explananda is an outcome of a decentralized and non-intentional process.
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Because of this reason, I think that it is only plausible to argue that an invisible hand
explanation explains the emergence or maintenance of its explanandum phenomenon.
Any other type of explanatory act would possibly not explicate the mechanism at
work. Remember that Menger does not talk about 'maintenance', but functioning.
Thus, I think the 'functional' part of Menger's 'organic explanations' can not be
considered as an invisible hand explanation.
Given these two essential features we can define constraints for being an invisible
hand explanation:
1. Explanandum phenomenon of the explanation must be an 'unintended consequence' in
the sense that
1.1.  Individual intentions must be directed to the individual level
1.2.  'Unintended consequence' must be located at the social level.
1.3. There must be more than one individual. And, 'unintended consequence' must
be dependent on the existence of many individuals.
2. Explanandum phenomenon must be a social pattern or institution - that constitutes a
coordinated or self-coordinating order (see Mäki, 1990ac).
3. Explanation must explicate the mechanism / process that brings about the 'unintended
consequence'.
4. Explanation explains the emergence or maintenance of the explanandum phenomenon.
Reader may wonder why I did not use one of the criteria that I have introduced for
Menger's 'unintended consequences', namely the criterion that the consequence must
be beneficial. I have reasons for this. Lets look at Brennan and Pettit's remarks about
the invisible hand mechanism to proceed:
"Spontaneous ordering mechanism usually described as the invisible hand (or backhand)
can be usefully characterized by the behavioral controls that it deploys: it is any sort of
mechanism which mainly supports the order in question by means of controls that are
decentralized and, as we shall say, contingently non-intentional." Brennan & Pettit
(1993: 192)
There are two notions in this characterization: invisible hand and invisible backhand.
Generally first one is associated with beneficial results and the latter with socially
undesirable outcomes. Pettit (1998: 257) argues that one of the main features of the
notion of "invisible hand" is its desirability
29. This is what Menger would understand
from an 'invisible hand'. But there is an other mechanism, that works essentially the
same way as 'invisible hand mechanism' does, and has socially undesirable results.
This mechanism is named as the 'inivisble backhand' (Hardin (1982), Nozick (1994),
Brennan & Pettit (1993)).
Connotations of the 'invisible hand' [in 'invisible hand explanation'] create a tendency
to consider the invisible hand explanations as explanations of beneficial social
patterns and institutions
30. Roughly, the distinction between the invisible hand and
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invisible backhand is the reason for the misconception about invisible hand
explanations. However, the desirability of the outcome is not an essential component
of an invisible hand explanation, because what is thought as invisible is the
mechanism that works.  To repeat, from the viewpoint of invisible hand explanations
it does not matter which side of the invisible hand is at work
31. An essential property
of an invisible hand explanation is making the 'invisible' mechanism visible and the
process explicit.
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4. Concluding remarks
Are invisible hand explanations different from other types of explanations? Answer
depends on what we mean by 'different' and 'types of explanation'. Before answering
the question let me make a couple of observations.
First, invisible hand explanations are generally thought to be the examples of
Hempel's (1965) genetic explanations (see Ullmann-Margalit, 1978). I think it is
misleading to say so. In a genetic explanation steps in the concrete event must be
explicit, but in an invisible hand explanation the theoretical reconstruction of the
process is important. For example Menger's explanation seems to be a causal account
of the emergence of the medium of exchange--although it does not make reference to
particular causes.
Second, other mold of invisible hand explanations which explains the maintenance of
a social pattern or institution looks like functional explanations or equilibrium
explanations (see Ullmann-Margalit, 1978). Here we should also remember Kincaid's
(1996) remark that proper functional explanations are causal explanations.
Thus, it is possible to characterize invisible hand explanations as covering causal,
functional, equilibrium and (for some) genetic explanations--if you call this a
characterization. It seems that as long as we explicate the invisible hand process in a
proper way it does not matter on the kind of explanation we give.
However, there are reasons for us to reserve this specific name (invisible hand
explanations) for these explanations. First, they explain in a very "doubtful" way;
namely they depend on conjectures rather than detailed (historical) facts. So, although
they are causal accounts (explanations) of general facts, they do their job in an
essentially different way.
Second, all invisible hand explanations can be gathered under a simple explanatory
question: How it is possible that a social (dis)order emerges or persists without the
conscious intervention of individuals. Technically speaking, they are different
because of their 'contrast space' definition (How it is possible that it is the unintended
consequence of human actions rather than being a product of design?).Moreover, this
specific explanatory question has a heuristic role for the researchers, which makes
them explain in similar ways:
To conclude, I want to direct your attention to the fact that philosophers of social
science paid little attention to the very common practice of explaining with
conjectures (and nowadays with computer simulations). I think that understanding and
appraising these explanations is a very important task for the philosophers of social
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6. Appendix I
"Concerning the Causes of the Different Degrees of Saleableness in Commodities
The degree to which a commodity is found by experience to command a sale, at a given
market, at any time, at prices corresponding to the economic situation (economic prices),
depends upon the following circumstances.
1. Upon the number of persons who are still in want of the commodity in question, and
upon the extent and intensity of that want, which is unsupplied, or is constantly
recurring.
2. Upon the purchasing power of those persons.
3. Upon the available quantity of the commodity in relation to the yet unsupplied (total)
want of it.
4. Upon the divisibility of the commodity, and any other ways in which it may be
adjusted to the needs of individual customers.
5. Upon the development of the market, and of speculation in particular. And finally.
6. Upon the number and nature of the limitations imposed politically and socially upon
exchange and consumption with respect to the commodity in question.
We may proceed, in the same way in which we considered the degree of the saleableness
in commodities at definite markets and definite points of time,to set out the spatial and
temporal limits of their saleableness. In these respects also we observe in our markets
some commodities, the saleableness of which is almost unlimited by place or time, and
others the sale of which is more or less limited.
The spatial limits of the saleableness of commodities are mainly conditioned --
1. By the degree to which the want of the commodities is disturbed in space.
2. By the degree to which the goods lend themselves to transport,and the cost of
transport incurred in proportion to their value.
3. By the extent to which the means of transport and of commerce generally are
developed with respect to different classes of commodities.
4. By the local extension of organised markets and their inter-communication by
'arbitrage'.
5. By the differences in the restrictions imposed upon commercial inter-communication
with respect to different goods, to interlocal and, in particular, in international trade.
The time limits to the saleableness of commodities are mainly conditioned --
1. By permanence in the need of them (their independence of fluctuation in the same).
2. Their durability, i.e. their suitableness for preservation.
3. The cost of preserving and storing them.
4. The rate of interest.
5. The periodicity of a market for the same.
6. The development of speculation and in particular of time-bargains in connection
with the same.
7. The restrictions imposed politically and socially on their being transferred from one
period of time to another.
All these circumstances, on which depend the different degrees of, and the different local
and temporal limits to, the saleableness of commodities, explain why it is that certain
commodities can be disposed of with ease and certainty in definite markets, i.e. within
local and temporal limits, at any time and in practically any quantities, at prices
corresponding to the general economic situation, while the saleableness of other
commodities is confined within narrow spatial, and again, temporal, limits: and even
within these the disposal of the commodities in question is difficult, and, in so far as the
demand cannot be waited for, is not to be brought about without a more or less sensible
diminution in price." Menger (1892)